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Abstract  
Using a comprehensive micro dataset spanning the period 1998-2005, this paper provides a systematic 
investigation of the relationship between financial structure and firm growth in China, controlling for 
the endogeneity of the former. It finds that financial structure does matter for firm growth in China, 
although this does not tell the whole story. The relative importance of the different financing sources 
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China has maintained an unprecedented growth for the last thirty years in spite of a financial system 
that is generally regarded as underdeveloped. Some scholars have tried to explain this apparent puzzle 
by arguing that the key driver of the country’s growth has been the private sector, and this sector tends 
to rely on informal finance and governance mechanisms rather than formal financing channels. Other 
economists beg to differ, and insist that the role of informal financing and governance mechanisms in 
supporting the growth of private sector firms is limited.  
 
This research paper contributes to this debate regarding the relative importance of formal and informal 
financing channels in China. Our work shows that it is difficult to draw an unequivocal conclusion that 
the formal financial system is more important than the informal one, or vice versa. The overwhelming 
majority of Chinese firms have mixed financial structure and the relationship between finance and 
growth is contingent on ownership and growth channel. 
 
A policy implication of this work is that China’s current economic reform should aim at establishing a 
broader financial system that is able to support the growth needs of heterogeneous firms. Thus, along 
with efforts to attract foreign finance and improve the operational efficiency of the state banking system, 
public policy should also focus on fostering the development of the informal financial system. An 
efficient informal financial mechanism not only provides an alternative vehicle for saving mobilisation 
and financing non-state firms, especially smaller ones, but can also be a catalyst for banking reforms 





China has maintained an unprecedented growth for the last thirty years in spite of 
a  financial  system  that  is  generally  regarded  as  underdeveloped  (Lardy,  2000). 
Hence,  some  economists  cite  the  case  of  China  as  a  counter  example  to  the 
apparent  consensus  that  a  healthy  financial  system  is  necessary  for  a  country’s 
economic growth (Allen et al, 2005). 
A possible explanation for this puzzle is put forward by Allen et al (2005) 
who argue that   the key driver of the country’s growth has been the private sector, 
and  this  sector  tends  to  rely  on  informal  finance  and  governance  mechanisms 
rather  than  formal  financing  channels.    This  view,  however,  is  not  universally 
accepted. Using a recent Investment Climate Survey (ICS) by the World Bank, Cull 
and Xu (2005) find that the performance of Chinese private enterprises is positively 
correlated with access to bank loans. Using the same dataset, Ayyagari et al (2007) 
also find that firms using formal financing sources grow faster than those financed 
by  alternative  channels,  and  conclude  that  the  role  of  informal  financing  and 
governance mechanisms in supporting the growth of private sector firms is likely 
to be limited. 
These contrasting conclusions regarding the relative importance of formal 
and  informal  financing  channels  in  China  can  of  course  be  due  to  the  use  of 
different  datasets  and  methodologies.    Allen  et  al  (2005)  adopt  a  case  study 
approach and collect data from a survey of 17 entrepreneurs and executives in 
Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces. These provinces are more advanced in terms of 
the  privatization  process  among  the  31  provinces  of  China.  Furthermore,  some 
areas in these two regions, such as Wenzhou, have a long history of small family 
business.  It  is  therefore  unsurprising  that  Allen  et  al  (2005)  find  that  informal 
financing channels based on human connections and reputations are important in 
their sample of firms. By contrast, the ICS survey used by Cull and Xu (2005) and 
Ayyagari et al (2007) displays quite different features. For example, only 39 firms 
(3% of the whole sample) are located in Wenzhou in the ICS data.  2 
Given that existing results are based on limited survey data, the jury is still 
out  on  the  relationship  between  finance  and  growth  in  China.    This  paper 
contributes to this debate by providing a systematic analysis of the relationship 
between  financing  sources  and  firm  growth  in  China  using  the  most 
comprehensive and up to date firm-level dataset available.  Besides bank loan and 
self-raised  finance,  this  dataset  allows  us  to  consider  other  sources  of  finance, 
namely state budget and foreign finance, that existing studies did not manage to 
analyse.   
The paper seeks to answer the following two specific questions:  (i) Does the 
source of finance matter for firm growth at all?  (ii) If so , which of the available 
financing sources – state budget, bank loans, self-raised finance and foreign finance 
-  is most important and for what type of firms? These are important questions, 
because  their  answers  have  implications  on  how  best  to  reform  the  country’s 
inefficient financial system in a way that is beneficial to all stakeholders.   It hardly 
needs emphasising that a well functioning financial system is crucial for the long-
term stability of the Chinese, and by implication, the global economy. 
Controlling for the potential endogeneity of the finance variables, we find 
that  capital  structure  matters  for  firm  growth,  but  the  relationship  between 
financing source and firm performance varies according to firm ownership and 
growth channel, namely total factor productivity (TFP) and employment growth.   
The following section reviews the theoretical arguments as to why financing 
sources should matter for growth.  Section 3 describes the financing patterns of 
Chinese firms.  Section 4 presents the empirical model and data, and discusses 
methodological issues.  Section 5 discusses the findings of the paper.  Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.  Why should financing sources matter? 
 
Starting  with  the  seminal  paper  of  Modiglinai  and  Miller  (1958),  the  corporate 
finance  literature  has  sought  to  explain  how  financial  structure  affects  firm 3 
performance. Two prominent theories have emerged in this respect. The first is the 
static trade-off theory (see Harris and Raviv, 1991, for a review), which suggests 
that  a  firm  chooses  a  debt–equity  mixture  that  optimises  its  value,  and  the 
resulting  ‘optimal  capital  structure’  is  determined  by  trading  off  the  costs  and 
benefits of equity and debt. The second is the pecking order theory (e.g. Marsh, 
1982), which advocates that the order of firm’s preference is internal finance being 
preferred to debt, and debt being more favoured than share issues. Developed and 
examined within the context of Western economies, these hypotheses appear to be 
less relevant for China. Firstly, publicly listed firms constitute only a small fraction 
of  the  population  of  firms1  and  existing  models  fail  to  offer  useful  insights 
regarding non-listed firms that have quite different capital structure2. Secondly, a 
principal assumption of all these theories that the suppliers of finance are privately 
owned is unrealistic in the case of  China.  
 In the context of India, Majumdar and Chibber (1999) argue that property 
rights are attenuated in state-owned financial institutions because the market for 
corporate  control  is  inadequate.  The  relationships  between  firms,  banks  and 
government  are  often  intertwined  and  this  induces  agency  problems  that  may 
result in a negative association between firms’ finance and performance.  
The  literature  provides  contrasting  views  regarding  the  role  of  informal 
financial institutions3.  Some scholars contend that informal financial arrangements 
can only play a complementary role to formal financial systems by serving the low 
end of the market, and are unlikely to be substitutes for the latter because of their 
inadequate  monitoring  capability  and  enforcement  mechanisms  (Ayyagari  et  al 
2007).  By contrast,   the theories of Stiglitz (1990) and Arott and Stigltz (1990) 
suggest  that  informal  financial  systems  in  low-income  economies  have 
comparative advantages in monitoring firms. 
                                                 
1 By 2004, there were only 1,337 listed firms in China, which are around 0.6% of total industrial 
firms (calculated based on China Statistical Yearbook 2005).   
2 For example, non-listed firms simply do not have share issues.
 
3 As defined in Ayyagai et al (2007), informal financial institutions include non-market institutions 
such  as  credit  cooperatives,  moneylenders,  informal  credit  and  insurance,  rotating  savings  and 
credit associations which do not rely on formal contractual obligations enforced through a codified 
legal system.  4 
3.  Financing Patterns in China  
 
China’s financial system is dominated by four large state-owned commercial banks 
that enjoy around 70% market share in terms of both savings and loans during 
1995-2002 (Du, 2006). These banks used to carry policy-related function (and may 
still do), which partially explains the soft-budget constraint phenomenon (Lin et al, 
1998), and the large amount of non-performing loans (e.g. Ma and Gung, 2002), as 
well as their operational inefficiency4. Furthermore, it has been argued that the 
Chinese banking sector is regionally segmented, financial resources are not mobile 
and they are allocated inefficiently (Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). 
China’s capital market is rather small by international standard. Compared 
to most countries in the LLSV-sample5, China is much smaller in terms of the size 
of its stock market. As Allen et al (2005) show, China’s total value traded over GDP 
is only 0.11 while the LLSV-sample average is 0.27; its market capitalization over 
GDP is 0.32 while the sample average is 0.47. This is not surprising, considering 
that the two Chinese stock exchange markets were established in the early 1990s, 
and by 2004 only 1,337 companies were listed in the two markets. The stock market 
is therefore not a relevant channel of finance for the majority of domestic firms. 
Apart from being small, China’s capital markets lack efficiency, due to ineffective 
policies and regulations (Heilmann, 2002; Allen et al., 2005).  
  The majority of Chinese firms are typically financed from a mixture of state 
budget,  bank  loans,  self-raised  finance  and  foreign  investment.  State  budget 
appropriations refer to the appropriations in the budget of the central and local 
governments earmarked for capital investment. This type of financial allocation 
has diminished gradually.  For example, the average proportion of firms getting 
state  budgets  has  dropped  from  33%  in  1998  to  6%  in  2005;  and  the  average 
                                                 
4 There is evidence that suggests the inefficiency of the state-banking sector can be explained by the 
high cost of labour and operating expenses (Du, 2006).  
5 LLSV refers to the widely cited paper of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998).
 5 
percentage of state budget in firms’ capital has declined   from 21% to 3%6 over the 
same period.  
Domestic bank loans  are borrowings from domestic banks and non-bank 
financial  institutions.  According  to  our  calculations,  the  role  of  bank  loans  in 
financing firms has declined over time.  In 1998, 50% of firms had bank loans and 
this figure has decreased to 25% in 2005. During the same period, the average share 
of bank loans in total capital has dropped from 22% to 9%, suggesting increased 
availability of alternative financing sources. 
The third and most important source of finance for many firms is self-raised 
finance.  This  includes  firms’  finance  from  capital  markets,  bonds  issued  by 
individual enterprises, individual borrowing and funds channelled through local 
governments or collectives. This is similar to what is referred to as informal finance 
in Ayyagari et al (2007).  
The fourth source of firm finance is foreign investment and it refers to the 
finance invested as equity capital by foreign investors and funds borrowed from 
foreign sources and managed by domestic enterprises.  It has been argued that the 
large amount of foreign direct investment in China is an indicator of indigenous 
private  sector  firms’  financial  constraints  (Huang,  2003).  Indeed,  foreign 
investment has become a very important source of financing for Chinese firms, and 
not only for private firms. It is therefore surprising that foreign finance seems to be 
ignored in existing finance and growth studies in China. 
As shown in Table 1, during 1998-2005, finance from state budgets, domestic 
bank  loans,  self-raised  finance  and  foreign  investment  accounted  for  9.59%, 
14.28%,  62.35%,  and  13.79%  of  firms’  total  finance  respectively  (Panel  II).  It  is 
interesting  to  note  that  ownership  structure  plays  an  important  role  in  firms’ 
financing mix.  We find that only firms with state ownership7 (SOEs and private 
firms  with  state  capital)  employ  all  four  financing  sources.  On  the  other  hand, 
firms with foreign ownership use all financing channels except state finance.  
Not  surprisingly,  firms  with  state  ownership  enjoy  the  greatest  access  to 
                                                 
6 The figures discussed in this section are calculated based on the dataset used in this paper, which 
is described in Section 4.3.  
7 The definition of ownership structure is explained in more detail in Section 4.3. 6 
bank loans. By contrast, self-raised finance supplies the vast majority of finance to 
collectively owned enterprises (82.48%) and pure private firms (87.9%). It is also 
interesting to see that foreign investment does not only finance foreign firms, but 
also domestic private firms (18.85% for private firms with state capital and 27.95% 
for private firms with foreign capital) and even SOEs (1.66%).  
4.  Methodology and data 
4.1 Model specification 
 
To asses the impact of financing sources on firm growth performance, we specify 
the following reduced form equation: 
it it i t i t i it D OWN X FIN Growth ε φ δ γ β α + + ′ + + + = − − ' ' ' 1 , 1 ,  .                                 (1) 
          In the above equation, Growth refers to TFP growth8 for firm i at time t; FIN is 
a  vector  of  financing  source  variables:  state  finance,  domestic  banks  loan,  self-
raised finance and foreign investments, defined by the share of each source in a 
firm’s  total  finance9.  The  vector  X  includes  a  set  of  control  variables  that  are 
hypothesised to impact on firm growth. It consists of quadratic terms of firm age 
and  size  (defined  as  total  employment)  and  initial  TFP  level  (e.g.  Evans,  1987; 
Caves, 1998 and Carbral and Mata, 2003).   D is the full set of ownership, industrial, 
regional and time dummies, and ε is a random error term.  
 
4.2 Estimation strategy 
 
Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  finance  variables  are  lagged  by  one 
period,  there  might  still  exist  the  possibility  of  firms’  capital  structure  being 
correlated with some unobserved factors that also influence firm growth. In this 
case, the problem of endogeneity would arise, and in order to deal with this issue, 
                                                 
8 We also measure firm performance in terms of employment growth by way of robustness 
analysis. 
9 Since the four shares add up to one, the state finance is set as  the base group whenever  all four 
financing sources are present. 7 
we adopt the modified control function approach (MCF) due to Wooldridge (2005).  
The detail of this approach is given in Appendix 1, but it worth noting that this 
method is most appropriate when the endogenous variables are truncated, such as 
the finance share variables. Wooldridge (2005) shows that if the baseline model 
such as our growth equation is augmented with so-called correction functions, then 
OLS  performed  on  the  extended  model  will  deliver  consistent  estimator  of  the 
vector of parameters of interest.  
To estimate control functions, valid instruments are needed. In this paper, 
we  employ  three  sets  of  instruments.  The  first  set  of  instruments  consists  of 
dummy  variables  indicating  the  administrative  level  the  firms  are  political 
affiliated with. A significant proportion of Chinese firms (including private firms) 
are affiliated with  some level of governments agencies that  can help them obtain 
credit guarantees or collateral assets that banks demand (see, Huang, 2003)10. The 
second set of instruments are defined at industry-region level, and theses are SOEs’ 
and private firms’ market share within the corresponding 3-digit SIC industry and 
province.  These  instrumental  variables  are  designed  to  capture  the  market  and 
political  environments,  which  influence  firms’  access  to  financing  sources.  For 
example, in the presence of soft-budget constraint (Lin et al, 1998), non-SOE firms 
in a region and industry with high concentration of SOEs would face relatively 
more difficulty in getting state budgets and bank loans. Also, firms in industries or 
provinces that are more open to private investment are more likely to get foreign 
finance.  The last set of instruments are defined at regional level, and it consists of 
indices of regional financial development, financial market competitiveness, asset 
allocation  marketization,  difficulty  in  attracting  FDI,  and  legal  environment 
(measured  by  the  number  of  lawyers  per  capita).    In  the  finance  and  growth 
literature,  some  of  these  variables  proved  to  be  good  instruments  for  finance 
(Levine, 2005).  
                                                 
10 Political affiliations are normally assigned to firms when they are set up and are therefore 
exogenous to the error term of the current growth process. 8 
4.3 Data and summary statistics 
Data source and structure 
 
Our  dataset  draws  on  the  Annual  Reports  of  Industrial  Enterprise  Statistics 
compiled  by  the  National  Bureau  of  Statistics  (NBS)  of  China,  covering  the 
population  of  Chinese  state-owned  manufacturing  enterprises  and  non-state-
owned enterprises with annual turnover more than 5 million RMB Yuan (about 
$620,000).  The  sample  accounts  for  nearly  90%  of  total  industrial  output.  The 
dataset employed in this paper spans the period of 1998-2005, containing detailed 
information such as inputs, output, source of finance, exports, product innovation, 
ownership  structure,  industry  affiliation,  and  geographic  location11.  The  data 
exhibit  a  good  balance  across  the  manufacturing  industries  (as  shown  in  the 
Appendix  Table  1.2)  and  provinces  in  China.  At  regional  level,  financial 
development  is  measured  by  private  credit  (credit  to  the  private  sector)  over 
regional GDP, to capture the degree of regional financial development (following 
King  and  Levine,  1993).  We  also  have  several  regional  indices  using  the  NERI 
Index of Marketization of China’s Provinces 2004 Report (Fan and Wang, 2005). 
 
Classification of firms’ ownership 
 
Traditionally  firm  ownership  is  classified  according  to  the  Regulation  of  the 
People’s  Republic  of  China  on  the  Management  of  Registration  of  Corporate 
Enterprises. This classification has been questioned recently (e.g. Dollar and Shang-
Jin  Wei,  2007),  given  that  ownership  changes  among  Chinese  enterprises  have 
frequently taken place during the reforms period. This motivates us to define a 
more reliable ownership composition measure based on the share of equity capital 
contributed by different sources, such as the state, collective investors, domestic 
private and foreign investors.  Specifically,  the ownership is classified as: (1) State-
                                                 
11 The output data are deflated using industry-specific ex-factory price indices obtained from China 
Statistical Yearbook (1999-2006). The capital variables are deflated using fixed asset price indices 
published in the China Fixed Asset Statistical Yearbook (1999-2006). 9 
owned  enterprises  (SOE):  if  state  capital  is  the  major  source  of  capital,  which 
means if state capital is equal or more than 50% in equity finance; (2) Collective 
enterprises (COE): if collective capital is equal or more than 50% in equity finance; 
(3) Foreign invested enterprises (FOR): if foreign capital (including capital from 
Hong  Kong,  Macau,  and  Taiwan  and  foreign  countries)  is  the  major  source  of 
capital, which means if foreign capital is equal or more than 50% in equity finance; 
(4)  Domestic  private  enterprises  (Private):  all  domestic  firms  which  are  not 
classified  as  SOEs  or  FORs.  This  group  can  further be  grouped  into  three:  (4a) 
Private with state capital (Private_state): if state capital is less than 50% in equity 
finance; (4b) Private with foreign capital (Private_for): if foreign capital is less than 
50% in equity finance and there is no state capital; (4c) Pure private (PPrivate), 
private firms without any state or foreign finance. 
  The data structure in terms of firm ownership is summarized in Table 2.  
The majority (56.17%) of the firms in the sample are private firms, most of which 
are  pure  private  firms.  There  are  relatively  few  private  firms  with  state  capital 
(2.66%) and private firms with foreign capital (5.38%). The average percentage of 
SOEs in the sample is 17.16%, but the figure has dropped from 34% in 1998 to 5% 
in 2005 (not presented in the table), mainly because of SOEs’ privatisation and a 
large-scale entry of non-state firms. We calculate that   13.51% of the firms are 
COEs and 13.17% are foreign invested firms, 60% of which are mainly financed by 
investors from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. 
Summary statistics 
 
Table 3 provides   summary statistics of the variables used in this paper. Total 
factor  productivity  (TFP)  is  estimated  following  the  methodology  of  Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003). This approach has been widely applied in recent productivity 
literature  because  it  can  control  effectively  for  the  simultaneity  between  firms’ 
choice of input levels and unobserved productivity shocks12. Average TFP growth 
reached 8.3% over the sample period, with a high standard deviation indicating 
                                                 
12 See Appendix 2 for the estimation detail. 10 
substantial heterogeneity among firms. Employment, however, dropped by 0.9% 
during the sample period, mainly due to layoffs in SOEs.  
5.  Empirical Findings 
Table 4 reports the endogeneity-corrected econometric estimates from the 
TFP growth model, based on the overall sample and  by firm ownership. In all 
cases,  the  null  hypothesis  of  exogeneity  of  finance  is  emphatically  rejected, 
vindicating the application of the modified control function approach. Across all 
sub samples, we find that initial TFP level enters with a negative and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that productivity convergence has been taking place.  The 
results reveal that younger firms tend to grow faster and a U-shaped relationship 
between firm size and growth, in line with the existing empirical evidence (e.g.   
Geroski, 1995).  
Turning  our  attention  to  the  financial  structure  variables,  our  results 
strongly suggest that the source of finance matters for firm growth.  For the whole 
sample, we find that foreign finance leads to the highest growth rate, followed by 
self-raised finance and bank loans, all else being equal.  
It is interesting to note that the relationship between financing source and 
firm  performance  is  heterogeneous  across  the  different  ownership  groups.  For 
example, SOEs with higher proportion of bank loans tend to be poor performers, 
while foreign finance has the most pronounced positive impact amongst this group 
of firms. A 10 percentage point increase in foreign finance is associated with a 
2.61% increase in the TFP growth of the average SOE.   
For private firms with some state finance (Private_state), foreign investment 
appears  to  be  the  only  significant  financing  channel  leading  to  productivity 
growth.    Interestingly,  access  to  bank  loans  has  its  largest  impact  on  private 
domestic  firms  with  some  foreign  investment  (Private_for)  and  foreign  owned 
firms  (FOR).    On  the  other  hand,  relative  to  bank  loans,  self-finance  is  a  more 
important  determinant  of  the  performance  of  COEs  and  domestic  pure  private 
firms (PPrivate). 11 
While, TFP growth is likely to be the key to long-term development, in the 
short term, firm growth through employment creation could be a desirable social 
objective. Accordingly, we also analysed the role of financial structure in driving 
employment  growth.    The  econometric  estimates  are  reported  in  Table  5  and 
confirm the results reported earlier that financial structure matters for firm growth. 
However, in contrast to the case of TFP growth, we now find that bank loans play 
a  more  prominent  role  in  generating  employment  growth.    For  domestic  pure 
private  firms  (PPrivate),  bank  loans  have  significant  positive  effects  on 
employment growth relative to self-raised finance.  For private firms with state 
capital  (Private_state),  we  find  similar  effects  of  bank  loans  in  promoting 
employment  growth,  although  the  highest  growth-boosting  effects  come  from 
foreign investment.  The importance of bank loans is also evident among foreign 
owned firms, as it is the most important driver of employment growth.   
So where does our findings fit in the context of the recent debate regarding 
the  relative  importance  of  China’s  formal  and  informal  financial  systems  in 
supporting firm growth? Allen et al (2005) argue that China’s economic growth is 
largely due to the performance of private sector firms that heavily rely on informal 
finance.    By  contrast, Ayyagari  et  al  (2007)  find  firms  financed  by  formal  bank 
loans grow faster.  Based on a large dataset that covers virtually the population of 
SOEs and a large chunk of non-state firms, and econometric techniques tackling 
the  potential  endogeneity  of  the  finance  variables,  our  work  shows  that  it  is 
difficult  to  draw  an  unequivocal  conclusion  that  the  formal  financial  system  is 
more important than the informal one or vice versa. The overwhelming majority of 
Chinese firms have mixed financial structure and the relationship between finance 
and growth is contingent on ownership and growth channel.   
 
6.  Conclusions   
Using  a  comprehensive  firm-level  dataset  spanning  the  period  1998-2005,  this 
paper  depicts  a  detailed  picture  of  the  financing  pattern  of  Chinese  firms,  and 12 
provides a thorough investigation of the relationship between financial structure 
and firm growth, controlling for the endogeneity of the former. 
The answer to the question posed in the title of this paper is an emphatic yes, 
although this does not tell the whole story.  The relative importance of the different 
financing sources depends on ownership and growth channel.   
A policy implication  of this work is that China’s current economic reform 
should aim at establishing a broader financial system that is able to support the 
growth needs of heterogeneous firms. Thus, along with efforts to attract foreign 
finance and improve the operational efficiency of the state banking system, public 
policy should also focus on fostering the development of the informal financial 
system.    An  efficient  informal  financial  mechanism  not  only  provides  an 
alternative vehicle for saving mobilisation and financing non-state firms, especially 
smaller ones, but can also be a catalyst for banking reforms by exposing state banks 




Appendix 1:  The modified control function approach (Wooldridge 2005) 
To  deal  with  the  potential  endogeneity  of  the  finance  share  variables  that  are 
truncated variables, we apply the modified control function (MCF) approach due 
to Wooldridge (2005). Wooldridge (2005) shows that if the baseline model such as 
Equation  (1)  is  augmented  with  so-called  correction  functions  (CF),  then  OLS 
performed  on  the  extended  model  will  deliver  consistent  estimates  of  the 
parameters of interest.    
Assume Fin.sourcej (j=1,2,3) are the three truncated finance share variables13, 
which have standard Tobit reduced forms: 






0 , 0 max .                                                     
where Z X, | ξ ~  Normal  (0,
2 σ ),  and  X  is  the  vector  of  covariates  determining 
growth  as  described  in  Section  4.1,  and  Z  is  a  vector  of  available  instrumental 
variables,  also discussed in Section 4.2. Wooldridge (2005) shows that the CF, for 
models with truncated endogenous variables can be generated as 
( ) ( ) σ ϑ σ ϑ / , ,
2 r Z X hj Φ ⋅ = ,   ( ) i i i z x r , , 1 ≡  and  ( ) 2 1, , ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ o ≡ , 
where  (.) Φ  is the cumulative normal density. Then Equation (1) of Section 4.1  can 
be modified as : 
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.         (2) 
Equation (2) can then is estimated by OLS with standard errors corrected through 
bootstrapping for the fact that the CFs are generated regressors.  Wooldridge 
(2005) shows that a test of  the joint significance of the control functions provides a 
test of exogeneity of the finance variables. 
                                                 
13 In case of four financing source variables included, share of state budget is the omitted group in 
the estimation.  14 
Appendix 2:  TFP estimation method 
Total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  is  estimated  following  the  methodology  of 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The advantage of this method lies in controlling for 
the  simultaneity  between  firm’s  choice  of  input  levels  and  unobserved 
productivity shocks by using firm’s intermediate inputs (such as raw materials or 
electricity) as proxies.  
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function for firm i at time t is: 
it it it t it l




ε ω β β β
+ + ≡
+ + + + =
) , (
0  
where y is log of value added, which is sales net of intermediate inputs (m), l is 
labour input and k is capital input, and   ) , ( ) , ( 0 it it it it k it it t t m k k k ω β β ω φ φ + + = ≡  is 
an unknown function of capital and intermediate inputs.  t φ is strictly increasing in 
the  productivity  shock it ω ,  so  that  it  can  be  inverted  and  one  can  write 
) , ( it it t it k m ω ω =   for  some  function t ω .  Levinshon  and  Petrin  (2003)  approximate 










δ   and  obtain 
estimates of  l β  and  t φ  (up to the intercept) via OLS. This constitutes the first stage 
of  the  estimation  procedure.  At  the  second  stage,  the  elasticity  of  capital  k β   is 
defined  as  the  solution  to ( )
2
* ˆ min
* ∑∑ − − −
i t




,  where  it ϖ   is  a 
nonparametric approximation  [ ] 1 | − it it E ω ω . Since the estimators involve two stages, 
the calculations of the covariance matrix of the parameters  take variations at both 
stages into account. Levinshon and Petrin (2003) note that the derivation of the 
analytical  covariance  matrix  is  quite  involved,  and  suggest  the  bootstrapping 
procedure to estimate standard errors. In this study 200 bootstrap replications are 
performed. Once consistent estimates of the input elasticities are derived, the log of 
productivity can be obtained as  it k it l it it k l y β β ω ˆ ˆ ˆ − − = .   
The  data  of  industrial  value-added  and  intermediate  input  are  deflated  by  ex-15 
factory price indices published in the Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1999-2006). The 
fixed assets data are deflated by fixed asset price indices published in the China 
Fixed Asset Statistical Yearbook and Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1999-2006). The 
estimation has been conducted by 2-digit SIC industry categories. 16 
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Tables 
Table 1: Financing pattern of Chinese enterprises during 1998~2005 
 
  Equity finance (by sources) 
 
Ownership  State 




Foreign  investment 
(incl.  from  HK, 
Macau and Taiwan) 
SOE  240.97  211.60  19.76  4.72 
COE  0  24.86  60.20  0 
Private enterprises:         
Private_state  149.18  235.48  227.42  49.44 
PPrviate  0  32.55  87.10  0 
Private_for  0  68.20  179.92  30.99 



































Total amount   38.92  66.40  74.17  18.22 







SOE  66.44%  29.07%  2.83%  1.66% 
COE  0  17.52%  82.48%  0 
Private enterprises:         
Private_state  21.39%  20.52%  39.25%  18.85% 
PPrviate  0  12.10%  87.90%  0 
Private_for  0  9.22%  62.83%  27.95% 


















Total   9.59%  14.28%  62.35%  13.79% 
Notes 
(i)  The figures given in the table are calculated using the dataset used in this paper. 
(ii)   For the definition of ownership categories, see Section 4.3. 
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Table 2: Ownership structure defined by capital structure during 1998-2005 
Ownership  Freq.  Percent 
State-owned enterprises (SOE)  250,651  17.16 
Collective enterprises (COE)  197,096  13.51 
Private enterprises:  820,261  56.17 
           - Private with state capital (Private_state)  38,829  2.66 
           - Pure private enterprises (PPrviate)  702,873  48.13 
           -Private with foreign capital (Private_for)  78,559  5.38 
Foreign invested enterprises  (FOR)  192,294  13.17 
Total  1,460,302  100 Table 3: Summary statistics 
  overall  SOE  COE  Private_state  PPrviate  Private_for  FOR 
Variables  mean  sd  mean  mean  mean  mean  mean  mean 
Firm growth                 
Growth of TFP (gTFP)  0.083  0.643  0.000  0.039  0.050  0.116  0.079  0.098 
Growth of employment (gEMP)  -0.009  0.528  -0.064  0.004  -0.009  -0.012  0.022  0.030 
Finance variables                 
Share of state budget  0.096  0.272  0.664  0.000  0.214  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Share of bank loans  0.143  0.26  0.291  0.175  0.205  0.121  0.092  0.048 
Share of self-raised finance  0.623  0.426  0.028  0.825  0.392  0.879  0.628  0.069 
Share of foreign investment  0.138  0.315  0.017  0.000  0.188  0.000  0.280  0.883 
Firm characteristics                 
TFP level  1.549  2.209  0.970  1.518  1.562  1.631  1.724  1.736 
Size (log of total employment)  4.837  1.205  5.062  4.809  5.495  4.641  5.118  5.131 
Age  10.28  11.06  21.93  13.50  13.84  7.83  7.98  7.12 
Capital  intensity  (log  of  net  fixed  assets  over  total 
employment) 
-1.175  0.871  -1.062  -1.180  -1.082  -1.202  -1.244  -1.177 
Regional/Industrial level indicator  mean  sd 
Market share (in sales) of the state sector by 3-digit 
SIC industry/region/year 
0.13  0.189 
Market  share  (in  sales)  of  the  private  sector  by  3-
digit SIC industry/region/year 
0.573  0.248 
Financial development (bank loans to private sector 
over regional GDP) 
0.008  0.006 
Financial market competitiveness  6.268  1.349 
Asset allocation marketization  5.677  2.89 
Difficulty in attracting FDI  3.731  2.487 
Law (total number of lawyers over total population 
in a province) 
5.233  5.111 
Intellectual property right protection  5.526  4.964 
 Table 4: Financing sources and firm TFP growth 
Dependent 
variable:  TFP 
growth 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Overall  SOE  COE  Private_state  PPrivate  Private_for  FOR 
Finance               
Bank Loan  0.0508***  -0.0196*  -0.0174**  0.0123  0.0073  0.099***  0.1439*** 
  (0.0072)  (0.0108)  (0.0095)  (0.0315)  (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.019) 
Self-raised 
finance 
0.0608***  0.0455***    -0.0096    0.044***  -0.0163 
  (0.0071)  (0.0129)    (0.030)    (0.018)  (0.011) 
Foreign 
finance 
0.0843***  0.2611***    0.1632***       
  (0.010)  (0.042)    (0.038)       
Firm 
characteristics 
             
Age  -0.0103**  -0.0161  -0.00396  0.00651  0.0162***  -0.116***  -0.104*** 
  (0.0048)  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.026)  (0.0063)  (0.019)  (0.023) 
Age-squared  -0.632***  -0.189  -1.127***  -0.616  -0.980***  2.219***  0.818 
  (0.12)  (0.36)  (0.32)  (0.60)  (0.16)  (0.46)  (0.63) 
Size  -0.111***  0.00158  -0.181***  -0.124***  -0.110***  -0.0800***  -0.107*** 
  (0.0059)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.035)  (0.0090)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
Size-squared  1.731***  1.298***  2.109***  1.803***  1.693***  1.465***  1.554*** 
  (0.055)  (0.12)  (0.17)  (0.29)  (0.090)  (0.17)  (0.17) 
TFP level  -0.139***  -0.160***  -0.170***  -0.139***  -0.133***  -0.132***  -0.170*** 
  (0.0017)  (0.0051)  (0.0043)  (0.0095)  (0.0025)  (0.0051)  (0.0045) 
Ownership               
COE  0.0247***             
  (0.0059)             
Private_state  0.0935***             
  (0.0068)             
PPrivate  0.101***             
  (0.0055)             
Private_for  0.107***             
  (0.0066)             
FOR  0.120***             
  (0.0082)             
Constant  1.421***  1.244***  1.793***  1.484***  1.284***  1.308***  1.749*** 
  (0.026)  (0.083)  (0.077)  (0.15)  (0.041)  (0.086)  (0.075) 
Observations  408449  53121  63942  13025  204090  32680  59080 
R-squared  0.22  0.17  0.19  0.20  0.25  0.21  0.12 
Reference 
group 











test  for  MCF 
model 
F(4,153137)= 
196.03;  Prob 
>F=0.0000 
F(4,22698)= 
60.47;  Prob 
>F =0.0000 
F(2,27886)= 







F = 0.0000 
F(3,11709) 
=6.94;Prob> 
F = 0.0000 
F(3,20932) 
=20.09;Prob 
> F= 0.0000 
Note 1: Standard errors are corrected for clustered firms in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Note 2: All estimations include the full sets of industry and regional dummies, both of which are 
jointly significant in all specifications. 
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(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
COEFFICIENT  overall  SOE  COE  Private_state  PPrivate  Private_for  FOR 
Finance               
Bank Loan  0.0367***  0.0150***  0.0116***  0.0531***  0.0113**  -0.060***  0.0405*** 
  (0.0035)  (0.0048)  (0.004)  (0.016)  (0.0075)  (0.012)  (0.010) 
Self-raised 
finance 
0.0167***  0.0278***    0.0366**    -0.0310***  -0.0177*** 
  (0.0036)  (0.0072)    (0.015)    (0.010)  (0.0069) 
Foreign 
finance 
0.0217***  0.0857***    0.0716***       
  (0.0056)  (0.019)    (0.017)       
Firm 
characteristics 
             
Age  -0.0359***  -0.0302***  -0.0302***  -0.0391***  -0.0241***  -0.0580***  -0.0653*** 
  (0.0021)  (0.0066)  (0.0064)  (0.012)  (0.0029)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Age-squared  -0.0651  0.440***  0.277*  0.375  -0.542***  0.234  0.392 
  (0.053)  (0.14)  (0.16)  (0.28)  (0.081)  (0.30)  (0.32) 
Size  -0.272***  -0.184***  -0.260***  -0.205***  -0.297***  -0.236***  -0.183*** 
  (0.0033)  (0.0077)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.0058)  (0.016)  (0.012) 
Size-squared  1.498***  1.174***  1.645***  1.292***  1.596***  1.238***  0.497*** 
  (0.031)  (0.055)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.059)  (0.14)  (0.12) 
Capital 
intensity 
-0.000747  0.000242  0.00400**  -0.00141  0.0038***  -0.0056  0.00890*** 
  (0.00070)  (0.0020)  (0.0018)  (0.0043)  (0.0010)  (0.0050)  (0.0020) 
Ownership               
COE  -0.0136***             
  (0.0030)             
Private_state  0.0310***             
  (0.0033)             
PPrivate  -0.00682**             
  (0.0028)             
Private_for  0.0433***             
  (0.0035)             
FOR  0.0496***             
  (0.0047)             
Constant  1.020***  0.658***  0.822***  0.697***  1.097***  0.887***  0.790*** 
  (0.011)  (0.033)  (0.040)  (0.064)  (0.019)  (0.057)  (0.045) 
Observations  695215  85065  95099  19247  364772  42277  88755 
















test  for  MCF 
model 
F(4,266919) 





Prob  >F 
=0.0000 
F(2,44779)= 
11.85;  Prob 
>F =0.0000 
F(4,9545)= 











Note 1: Standard errors are corrected for clustered firms in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Note 2: All estimations include the full sets of industry and regional dummies, both of which are jointly 




Table 1: Dataset structure 
Table 1.1 By year 
year  Freq.  Percent 
1998  149,559  10.24 
1999  147,060  10.07 
2000  148,239  10.15 
2001  156,782  10.74 
2002  166,809  11.42 
2003  181,067  12.4 
2004  259,313  17.76 
2005  251,473  17.22 
Total  1,460,302  100 
 
Table 1.2 By 2-digit SIC industrial classification 
sic2  Freq.  Percent 
13-Food Processing  95,706  6.55 
14-Food Production  39,877  2.73 
15-Beverage Industry  27,639  1.89 
16-Tabacco Industry  2,313  0.16 
17-Textile Industry  122,010  8.36 
18-Garments and Other Fibre Products  69,829  4.78 
19-Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products  34,303  2.35 
20-Timber Processing  28,231  1.93 
21-Furniture Manufacturing  15,994  1.1 
22-Papermaking and Paper Products  44,966  3.08 
23-Printing and Record Medium Reproduction  33,485  2.29 
24-Cultural, Educational and Sports Goods  18,365  1.26 
25-Petroleum Refining and Coking  10,775  0.74 
26-Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products  108,354  7.42 
27-Medical products  31,803  2.18 
28-Chemical Fibre  7,487  0.51 
29-Rubber Products  17,212  1.18 
30-Plastic Products  65,582  4.49 
31-Nonmetal Mineral Products  129,913  8.9 
32-Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals  34,986  2.4 
33-Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals  26,786  1.83 
34-Metal Products  77,562  5.31 
35-Ordinary Machinery  103,484  7.09 
36-Special Purposes Equipment  61,092  4.18 
37-Transport Equipment  67,947  4.65 
39-Other Electronic Equipment   76,420  5.23 
40-Electrical Equipment and Machinery  50,153  3.43 
41-Electronic and communication appliances  22,793  1.56 
42-Meters and office appliances  30,825  2.11 
43-Other Manufacturing  4,410  0.3 
Total  1,460,302  100 
 